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Summary 
The Government‟s latest attempts to reform the House of Lords coincide with a 
number of significant anniversaries of previous attempts.  This article notes the 
Secretary of State for Justice's adoption of the 100th anniversary of the Parliament 
Act 1911 as a target to get the reform legislation through, examines what can be learnt 
from those previous attempts and suggests that the debate over election versus 
appointment may involve a false dichotomy. 
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Introduction 
11 November 2009 is the 10
th
 anniversary of the House of Lords Act 1999, the Act 
which, following an amendment tabled by Lord Weatherill, expelled all but 92 of the 
hereditary peers from the House of Lords. This Act was always going to be „stage 
one‟ of the reforms and the retention of a small number of hereditary peers was, as 
noted by Lord Irvine LC, designed to act as a guarantor of further reform in stage 2 
(1999a, col 207). The 2009-2010 session of Parliament will also see legislation “to 
complete the process of removing the hereditary principle from the second chamber” 
and “a draft bill for a smaller and democratically constituted second chamber” (Brown 
2009, col 24), thereby breaching the agreement behind the Weatherill amendment 
which was “negotiated between Privy Councillors on Privy Council terms and binding 
in honour on all those who have come to give it their assent” (Lord Irvine, 1999a, col 
207).  
 
These new proposals are the latest in a long line of White Papers and discussion 
documents (e.g. White Paper 2008, White Paper 2007, White Paper 2001, DCA 2003) 
since stage one reform. In the House of Commons debate following the publication of 
the 2008 White Paper on reform of the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor and 
Secretary of State for Justice, Jack Straw MP, agreed that the 100
th
 anniversary of the 
Parliament Act 1911 would be a good target for getting the reform legislation onto the 
statute books – but considered that the process would be most unlikely to be complete 
by then (2008, col. 27). The Parliament Act 1911 was passed following the House of 
Lords rejection of the Liberal government‟s budget of 1909 and the subsequent failure 
of cross-party talks on reform to come to an agreement. Rather than deal with the 
question of composition then, the government decided simply to limit the delaying 
power of the House of Lords to two sessions, stating in the preamble that it “intended 
to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber 
constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis, but such substitution cannot be 
immediately brought into operation”. The fact that that two-stage reform remained 
incomplete was instrumental in the adoption of the Weatherill amendment (Lord 
Cranborne 1999, cols.221-222), as the remaining 92 hereditary peers would act as an 
impetus on the Labour party to progress to stage 2. 
 
However, those are just two of the recent or forthcoming significant anniversaries of 
attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to reform the upper chamber – and while 
the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice may consider the centenary of 
the Parliament Act 1911 to be a good target date, an analysis of some of the other 
anniversaries may prove to be more instructive. 
 
2008 saw the centenary of the Roseberry Report, the 90
th
 anniversary of the Bryce 
Report, the 50
th
 anniversary of the Life Peerages Act 1958, the 40
th
 anniversary of the 
1968 White Paper, and the 30
th
 anniversary of the Home Committee. Coming up is 
not only the centenary of the Parliament Act 1911, but this year sees the 60
th
 
anniversary of its amending Act, the Parliament Act 1949, and the 10
th
 anniversary of 
the Wakeham Commission itself (the pre-cursor to the current White Paper and its 
two predecessors). There are some common aspects within these attempted reforms, 
not least the difficulty in attaining consensus and the inclusion of an appointed 
element. 
 
As with the current White Paper, the report of Viscount Bryce‟s committee in 1918, 
as well as those of Lord Home (1978) and of Lord Wakeham‟s Royal Commission 
(2000), proposed some form of hybrid house. Bryce favoured a composition whereby 
approximately 75 per cent would be indirectly elected by MPs in regional groups, 
with the remainder being a dwindling number of hereditary peers and bishops and an 
increasing number of other appointees; Home preferred 60 per cent to be elected, 
either directly or indirectly, thereby enhancing legitimacy while maintaining some 
continuity, history and breadth of interest and experience; whereas Wakeham 
proposed a “significant minority” (p.8) of regional elected members (between 12 per 
cent and 35 per cent depending on which of their three models was used) with the 
remainder being appointed. Although the Wakeham Report informed “above all” the 
discussions leading to the current White Paper (Straw 2008, col.21)
 
and although its 
principles of composition were accepted by the Government in 2000 (Russell & 
Cornes 2001, p.99), its recommendations on composition have been inverted, 
following the decision to take the votes in the House of Commons in March 2007 as 
indicating that only a wholly elected House or an 80 per cent elected house should 
merit consideration. All of these reform proposals would have constituted, or 
constitute, a revolutionary change to the House, and all the historic plans have failed 
to come to fruition, but all have accepted that appointment brings with it some 
benefits to the House (see e.g. Wakeham 2000, paras. 11.19 and 11.29 and White 
Paper 2008, para.6.14). To a large extent, these are the same benefits that the 
introduction of life peers either brought to the House or enhanced. 
 
The Introduction of Life Peerages 
Life peerages had been a feature of many reform attempts in the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 centuries (there were second readings of bills by e.g. Lord Russell in 1869, Lord 
Salisbury in 1888 and Lord Rockley in 1935), following the ruling in the Wensleydale 
Case (1856) 5 HLC 958; 10 ER 1181 that Sir James Parke, who had been created a 
baron for life so as to inject legal knowledge into the House, was not in fact entitled to 
sit in the House of Lords. The solution in that case was to give Sir James Parke, a 
noted judge who was by then in his mid-70s and who had no male heir, a hereditary 
barony. Judicial peers went on to be introduced by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 
1876 and they were granted life tenure 11 years later by section 2 of the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act 1887. It took some 70 years after that, for life peerages to be granted 
in general. 
 
The list of the first non-judicial life peers to be members of the House of Lords was 
announced on 24
th
 July 1958, the Life Peerages Act 1958 having received Royal 
Assent on 30
th
 April. Over the years this was to progressively allow the House to draw 
on an even wider range of experience, start to redress the hereditary bias toward the 
Conservatives, improve the flexibility to appoint people to government and lead to a 
more representative House.
1
 Among the 14 peers on the first list were the first four 
                                                 
1
 There have been well over 1,000 life peerages created in the past 50 years (many more than the total 
number of hereditary peerages still extant) but life tenure has prevented the House from becoming 
women to be members of the House of Lords. 50 years on, while there is a long way 
to go before the House of Lords could claim to be fully representative of the nation, it 
has more female members than has the House of Commons (19.7 per cent against 
19.4 per cent) – and proportionally considerably more when one looks solely at the 
life peers (where women make up 24 per cent). (Figures are drawn from data available 
from the House of Lords Public Information Office and are as at 30 June 2008. The 
figure for life peers is so much higher than for the whole House as the remaining 
hereditary peers, Lords (and former Lords) of Appeal in Ordinary, and Bishops are, 
unsurprisingly, overwhelmingly male). Furthermore, not only is the proportion of 
black and Asian minority ethnic members, at 4.8 per cent, more than twice that of the 
Commons but it is also greater than the proportion of black and Asian minority ethnic 
councillors in local government (and the contrast is heightened when looking at ethnic 
minority women who comprise 2 per cent of the Lords, less than 1 per cent of 
councillors and 0.3 per cent of the Commons).
2
 
 
The 1968 White Paper: Undilute Patronage, Complexity and an 
Unholy Alliance 
While the power of appointment has some clear advantages, there are also some 
significant, and commonly cited, drawbacks. The increased power of prime 
ministerial patronage was one of a number of criticisms of the 1968 White Paper. This 
White Paper proposed a different sort of hybrid house with two tiers of members: 
those who could vote and those who could only sit and speak. There would be some 
230 voting peers whereas those who had previously inherited their title, those aged 
over 72 and those who did not play an active part in the House would not be eligible 
to vote but could otherwise take part in activities (but there would be no such right to 
sit for those who subsequently inherited a title). Other principles included that the 
government was to be given a small majority over the opposition, but not an overall 
majority due to the presence of the number of Crossbenchers, and the power of delay 
was to be reduced to 6 months.  
 
The removal of the hereditary peers (whose presence helped to dissolve the power of 
patronage), the inequity in there being second-class members, the complexity of 
determining who was a voting member, the possible tendency to increase the use of 
the reduced power of delay (in inverse proportion to its strength) and the existence of 
many other issues, of greater importance to the Labour party and to the electorate, that 
should be dealt with instead were just some of the criticisms levied at the proposals 
(Baroness Asquith of Yarnbury 1968, col.696; Lord Gardiner LC 1968, col. 646; Lord 
Coneford 1968, col. 792; Dorey 2006, pp. 604-607). Although the White Paper was 
endorsed by the House of Lords, after a three-day debate, by 251 votes to 56, it fared 
less well in the Commons. The subsequent bill, the Parliament (No. 2) Bill, which had 
its Commons second reading in January 1969, was withdrawn on 17
th
 April 1969 
                                                                                                                                            
unduly large. As can be seen in the circumstances surrounding the Wensleydale Case, the hereditary 
principle acted to reduce the number of peerages that were created. 
2
 The comparative figures for black and Asian minority ethnic members are 2.3 per cent for the House 
of Commons (15/645) and under 4 per cent of local councilors (“Today 2.7 per cent of councillors are 
Asian and 0.5 per cent of councillors are Black”, Watson 2007). The figure of less than 1 per cent for 
black and Asian minority ethnic women councillors, and that there are only 2 minority ethnic women 
MPs out of 645, is drawn from a written statement by the Minister for Women and Equality (Harman 
2008, col. 8WS).  
while in committee, following a long delaying action fought by the „unholy alliance‟ 
of Enoch Powell and Michael Foot. Although coming from different sides – with 
Powell contending that the House had historic legitimacy and Foot, asserting the 
supremacy of the Commons, taking a unicameralist position (and failing that 
preferring a less legitimate second chamber as that would not rival the Commons) – 
they, together with others, obstructed the progress of the bill so successfully that by 
April 1969 only the preamble and the first five clauses had been debated (Dorey 2006, 
p.608). 
 
The House of Lords Act 1999 and the Weatherill amendment 
The complexity, and to some extent the undilute patronage, of the White Paper and 
Bill of 40 years ago was avoided with regard to the House of Lords Act 1999 through 
the expediency of the adoption of both a two-stage approach and the Weatherill 
amendment. The Blair government proposed that stage one should see the abolition of 
the hereditary peers‟ right to sit, with full reform, stage two, occurring after an 
investigation of the role and powers of the House (i.e. the Royal Commission on 
Reform of the House of Lords chaired by Lord Wakeham). Concern by the Labour 
party that Conservative opposition could obstruct the Bill abolishing the hereditary 
peers‟ right, and concern by the opposition that stage 2 reform could be as long-
coming as that presaged in the preamble to the Parliament Act 1911 (Cranborne 1999, 
col. 221), led to a consensus-seeking proposal tabled by Lord Weatherill that a block 
of hereditary peers should remain until stage two reform occurred. Along with the 
hereditary Royal Office holders – the Earl Marshall and Lord Great Chamberlain – 
and the number of hereditary peers who acted as deputy speakers or held other similar 
posts, one-tenth of the hereditary peers were to remain, elected among their number 
(Lord Weatherill 1999, cols. 213-215). The then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, 
acknowledged that the hereditary peers who remained under the system would have 
greater authority because of their election by their peers and that their presence would 
guarantee a second stage of reform given the Labour manifesto commitment to end 
the hereditary presence (1999a, col 207). The House of Lords Act 1999 received 
Royal Assent on 11
th
 November 1999 and took effect when the new parliamentary 
session began six days later. 
 
Now nearly ten years on from the stage one reform, it is clear that stage two has 
indeed been slow in coming. While there has undoubtedly been a lot of work, with the 
report of the Royal Commission and now three White Papers, further actual reform 
appears to remain almost continually on the horizon and no closer. However, the 
length of time – well over twice that envisaged by Lord Irvine (1999b, col 24) – gives 
a greater opportunity to look at the „transitional‟ house.  
 
As noted above, the House of Lords can now claim to be more representative in its 
composition, in terms of gender and ethnicity, than the House of Commons (and in 
terms of ethnicity than the body of local councils). Whereas the old House of Lords 
had a Conservative bias, there are now similar numbers of Labour, Conservative and 
Cross-bench peers (215, 202 and 203 respectively as of 30 June 2008). This increase 
in balance has coincided with an increase in the assertiveness of the House of Lords 
(government defeats in the years following the passage of the House of Lords Act 
1999 have risen on average by around 50 per cent to almost 60 defeats a session 
(White Paper 2008, para. 2.5)). The process of election has also had an effect on the 
hereditary peers‟ comparative attendance. Previously decried as backwoodsmen, the 
average attendance figures for the „Weatherill‟ hereditary peers far exceeds that of the 
life peers. In the parliamentary session 1998/99, the hereditary peers‟ average 
attendance was just under two-thirds that of the average life peer whereas in the 
sessions following the passing of the House of Lords Act 1999 the Weatherill 
hereditary peers‟ average is regularly around 130 per cent of that of the average life 
peer. However, while stage one reform has redressed a number of concerns, the 
Labour government officially remains committed to introducing stage two reform. 
 
 Average attendance (days) (N.B. length of session varies) 
  
 Hereditary Peers „Weatherill‟ 
Hereditary Peers 
Life Peers 
1998/1999 53.5 --- 81.9 
2001/2002 --- 93.7 69.2 
2002/2003 --- 115.1 87.2 
2003/2004 --- 116.5 89.6 
2004/2005 --- 111.1 83.7 
2005/2006 --- 98.1 74.7 
2006/2007 --- 105.1 83.2 
 
The Government’s Next Steps: Three White Papers, Two Free 
Votes…  
 
Their first attempt at stage two reform, the White Paper published in June 2001 in 
response to the report of the Royal Commission on House of Lords Reform, proposed 
a 20 per cent elected house with the remainder being appointees (20 per cent 
independent and 60 per cent party appointees). This ran into strong Labour backbench 
opposition, with a number of calls for a larger elected element, and was dropped in 
May 2002. Phillipson (2004, p.356) considers that the February 2002 proposals of the 
Public Administration Select Committee more closely represented MPs‟ views; it 
juggled the Royal Commission‟s proportions so that there would be 60 per cent 
elected and 20 per cent party political appointees with the remaining 20 per cent being 
independent appointees (Fifth Report 2002, para 96). 
 
Following the revolt of their own backbench to their proposals, the Labour 
government then adopted a cross-party approach. This initially led to seven options 
(from wholly appointed through to wholly elected) being placed before both Houses 
and the almost farcical situation in February 2003 where the House of Commons 
voted against all seven. A government Bill introduced in late 2003 to remove the 
remaining hereditary peers was withdrawn in 2004 following Labour and 
Conservative fears that it would not so much be the herald of stage two but turn out to 
be the final reform and as such leave too much patronage with government even with 
an independent appointments commission (Dorey 2006, p.615). The re-run of the 
2003 free vote in March 2007, following the February 2007 White Paper „House of 
Lords: Reform‟, saw the House of Commons vote in favour of the wholly elected 
option (by 337 to 224) and 80 per cent elected options (by a much smaller margin of 
305 to 267). The House of Lords, however, voted only for a 100 per cent appointed 
House, and there is some argument that the level of the support in the Commons for a 
wholly elected House was the result of political maneuvering and does not reflect the 
true feeling of the Commons (e.g. Sir Patrick Cormack 2008, cols.28-29: “the vote for 
100 per cent. was caused by a tactical switch by a number of Members, led by the 
hon. Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland), who is nodding vigorously”). 
Nevertheless, the government decided that the July 2008 White Paper should only 
consider the options which had received support in the House of Commons. 
 
The July 2008 White Paper thus only considered the options of an 80 per cent and a 
wholly elected House – and does not decide on either but instead leaves it open for 
further consultation. This is just one of a number of points that the White Paper left 
open and that is one of the reasons it was not well received, coming in for criticism in 
both Houses (HL Deb 2008; HC Deb 2008), by the media (e.g. Wintour 2008, July 
19; Riddell 2008, July 15; Norton 2008, July 15) and from a former speaker of the 
House of Commons (–– “Boothroyd puts boot into Straw”, Birmingham Evening 
Mail, July 16, 2008). Although it is a government White Paper it is again the product 
of cross-party discussions and there are areas where there has been no agreement (e.g. 
whether to use first-past-the-post or another electoral system and, if an 80 per cent 
elected house is chosen, the presence of Bishops and the status of the appointments 
commission). However, it is clear that the powers of the House of Lords should not be 
reduced (White Paper 2008, chapter 5) despite there earlier having been proposals to 
limit scrutiny of bills to just 60 days and, as with the 1968 White Paper, cut the power 
to delay to 6 months (Dorey, 2006, p.617).  
 
Among the more concrete reforms is the proposal that elected members of the 
reformed House should serve 12-15 year terms and not be available for re-election (an 
idea designed to enhance independence which has been a feature of many other 
reform proposals, e.g. Wakeham and Bryce). The government also proposes that 
members should be salaried and, while leaving the fine detail open, proposes on 
principle that members‟ salary should be less than that of MPs but more than that of 
members of devolved legislatures (which would mean at today‟s prices that a member 
elected for 12 years would receive some £600,000). The method of election, the 
transitional arrangements (with three possibilities considered with final end dates 
ranging from 2020 to 2040) and, less intractably, the presence of both Bishops (which 
is opposed by the Liberal Democrats but which otherwise is either accepted or does 
not attract forceful opposition, according to the study by Harlow, Cranmer and Doe 
2008) and retired Justices of the Supreme Court
3
 all remain open. Although the White 
Paper does not decide on whether the reformed House should be wholly or 80 per cent 
elected, it does note the difficulty of including an independent element within a 
wholly elected chamber (para 6.12).  
 
Despite the preamble to the Parliament Act 1911, an appointed element has been a 
key feature of many reform proposals from Bryce 90 years ago to Home 30 years ago 
and Wakeham 10 years ago, as well those over the last 10 years. As Phillipson (2004, 
                                                 
3
 While the White Paper considers that retired Justices of the Supreme Court, like many other notable 
figures such as retired Cabinet Secretaries, Chiefs of the Defence Staff, Archbishops, etc., could be 
considered for appointment by the Appointments Commission „in the normal way‟ (para 6.58) as part 
of the 20 per cent, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice in the debate appeared to 
agree with a point that allied them with the Lords Spiritual (Straw 2008, col. 26) in response to the 
Shadow Secretary of State (Herbert 2008, col. 25). 
pp.352-354) notes, hybridity seemed to be favoured by the government until just 
before the February 2003 indicative votes on composition when it was described by 
Lord Irvine LC, among others, as a “nonsense” and a “parliamentary disaster”. 
Nevertheless, the debate has been over how big the elected and appointed elements 
should be (from Wakeham‟s 12 per cent-35 per cent to the Public Administration 
Select Committee‟s 80 per cent via the government‟s original 20 per cent). However, 
the debate over election versus appointment, and as to the proportions of a hybrid 
House, may well be a false dichotomy.  
 
A False Dichotomy? 
Following on from last year‟s 50th anniversary of the Life Peerage Act and this year‟s 
10
th
 anniversary of the House of Lords Act, arguably both very valuable and 
successful reforms, a „Weatherill 2‟ system – extending the principle of the Weatherill 
hereditaries to Life Peers (but with the numbers of party peers changing according to, 
for example, either general or local election results) – could provide a combination of 
the benefits of election and appointment while mitigating some of the problems with 
both.  
 
It would also satisfy all the principles which, in framing the February 2007 White 
Paper, the government laid down as underpinning reform of the House of Lords:  
 
“Primacy of the House of Commons;  
Complementarity of the House of Lords;  
A More Legitimate House of Lords;  
No Overall Majority for Any Party;  
Non Party-Political Element;  
A More Representative House of Lords;  
Continuity of Membership” (White Paper 2007, p.25) 
 
as well as the addition in the July 2008 that “the second chamber should take account 
of the prevailing political view amongst the electorate, but also provide opportunities 
for independent and minority views to be represented” (White Paper 2008, p.4). 
 
Such a system would bear a resemblance to that proposed by the Roseberry report (the 
80
th
 anniversary of which was last year)
4
 but with a democratic difference. Roseberry 
proposed that the House of Lords should consist of a number of representative peers 
elected by peers (according to type of peerage) along with those peers who had held 
high office, elected bishops, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and a small number of life 
peers. The idea foundered due to a fatal defect, from the Liberal‟s point of view, as it 
entrenched a Tory majority and removed their ability to threaten to flood the House of 
Lords with new members (Holland 1912, pp.52-53). There is no such majority today. 
Rather than having peers elected according to type (e.g. so many Dukes, so many 
Marquesses, etc.), as with Roseberry, or the Weatherill system of each party‟s 
hereditary peers electing, in 1999, 10 per cent of their number to represent them (with 
                                                 
4
 It also bears some resemblance to a proposal put forward by Lord Pearson during the passage of the 
House of Lords Act 1999 but which was opposed as it was introduced as an alternative to the already 
accepted Weatherill amendment rather than as a proposal for stage 2. In Lord Pearson‟s proposal, the 
numbers of elected Cross-bench, Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat peers would be fixed by 
statute at 240, 200, 200 and 60 respectively (Lord Pearson 1999, cols 43-59).  
subsequent by-elections), the number of sitting peers for the political parties would 
vary according to recent election results. The number of cross-bench peers could be 
fixed close to the current level and thus provide a far greater independent element 
than the 2008 White Paper, with its maximum of 20 per cent appointees, could allow. 
The election of peers from within their own number to fill the parties‟ allocations 
would avoid the house growing to such a gargantuan size which would, as Hazell and 
Seyd (1998, p.383) illustrate, be inherent in a system whereby life peerages are 
created to ensure proportionality between the parties. There could, however, also be a 
provision to allow for a small number of peers to be appointed directly to the House, 
for example to take up ministerial positions (as with Lady Chalker in the previous 
Conservative government and Lord Malloch-Brown, among others, in the current 
Labour government), who would then face election at the next opportunity. 
 
It would thus take account of the prevailing political view among the electorate, 
whilst preserving an element of flexibility in appointment to government and 
maintaining a strong independent element that would contribute to ensuring that there 
was no overall majority for any party. The indirect election would, as stated in the 
July 2008 White Paper, “offer some degree of democratic legitimacy” (para.4.35). 
While indirect election was eschewed by the White Paper, the stated objections were 
the difficulties in deciding which institutions should be represented in any electoral 
college, the short-term nature of the secondary mandate and the similarity to 
appointment (paras 4.35 – 4.41). This does would not apply to a „Weatherill 2‟ system 
as the direct electorate would be the party and cross-bench life peers and the double-
lock of being made a peer and then facing election would dilute the similarity to 
simple appointment. Furthermore, while there would be some variation in the 
numbers for each party, there would be substantial continuity of membership, and, 
indeed, the mechanism for election could operate on the widely mooted three-term 
system if wanted. While indirect election does not confer as much legitimacy as direct 
election, it does meet the requirements of enhanced legitimacy and complementarity, 
does not challenge the primacy of the House of Commons in the way that a directly 
elected House using proportional representation might, does not risk increasing voter 
fatigue, and should save much of the additional £43 million pounds that the direct 
elections are estimated to cost (White Paper 2008, para. 9.3). 
 
Such a system would build on the reforms of the Life Peerage Act 1958 and House of 
Lords Act 1999 and be in keeping with the evolutionary changes of the House. 
Although there are strong and opposing views held on all sides, unlike the 
revolutionary changes proposed within the 2008 White Paper – and indeed earlier 
failed attempts such as the 1968 White Paper and the Bryce Report (1918) – the 
changes would be simpler, and are a development of what has already been tried and 
tested and proved successful, and thus there are fewer areas for contention. The 
system combines much of the benefits of election and appointment, allows for a 
greater independent element and does not create a two-tier house which hybridity 
risks. Moreover, it does away with the need for long and complex transitional 
arrangements, potentially running until the middle of this century. Instead, following 
the precedent of the House of Lords Act 1999, it could be a short and relatively simple 
Act and be in operation within weeks, or even days, of being enacted. The 100th 
anniversary of the 1911 Act could thus be well within sight. 
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